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The aim of this book is to discover and describe the "characteristic
concepts and institutions" of the Roman law of obligations' and then to
trace their subsequent development and influence through the Middle
Ages and the early modem period, up to the present day. This is a most
ambitious work. It is also a difficult one. The text is very long - over
1100 pages. It contains more than a few untranslated passages from
several foreign languages: Latin, German, French, even Dutch. And it
takes for granted that the reader comes to what the author disarmingly
describes as "the arduous task that lies ahead,"3 equipped already with
a basic knowledge of Roman law and institutions. The conscientious
reader who is mystified by a iudicium bonaefidei,4 who has never heard
of Augustin Leyser, or who has difficulty knowing what it means to
say that "the merces had to consist in pecunia numerata,"6 will have
some extra work to do. They are not explained here. The reader should
therefore be warned in advance; this book makes real demands upon
anyone who takes it up.
However, the persevering reader will be more than amply rewarded
for his efforts. The book is full of life. Indeed it has been a very long
time since this reviewer has come across a book of comparative legal
history so consistently enlightening and interesting. Zimmermann is a
wonderful tour guide along the great paths of legal development. He
combines genuine learning with both an ability to put familiar sights into
a new light and a willingness to explore obscure byways along the way.
On virtually every page, the reviewer learned something new about
Roman law, about the long shadow it has cast over the development of
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REINHARD ZIMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE

CiviuAN TRADmoN xii (1990).
2.
See, e.g., id. at 382 (stating "[tlhe South African courts apply 'huur gaat voor koop'"
without giving a translation). The reviewer found no examples of such usage of Italian or
Spanish; for the most part, the book leaves open the subject of connecting its subject with
developments in these centers of the ius commune.
3.
Id. at xiv.
4. See, e.g., id. at 277. Literally, a "judgment of good faith," it referred to cases in which
the judge was accorded the authority to decide the merits and shape the remedy according to
equitable principles based upon bonafides. See also id. at 761-62 (explaining use of iudicia bonae
fidei in cases involving set-off remedies).
5.
Id. at 545. Augustin Leyser (d. 1752) was the author of MEDITATIONES AD PANDECrAs
(1717-47) and a professor of law at several German universities, ending his teaching career in
his hometown of Wittenberg.
6.
Id. at 354. Literally, "the reward had to consist in money paid," it means that in
leases of real property, the rent ordinarily had to have been paid in cash.
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western law, and even about the legal dilemmas and possibilities of the
present day. This review first looks at the coverage of the book, then
provides a more extended treatment of some of the author's themes; at
the end, a brief appreciation for the book's merits.
A. THE BOOK'S SCOPE AND METHOD
To many American readers, the word "obligations" is simply the
civil law's peculiar way of saying "contracts." Properly speaking, of
course, the term means more than that; Justinian's Institutes divided
obligations into four classes: contractual, quasi-contractual, delictual, and
quasi-delictual, and at least the first three of these have stuck.7
However, at its core the term has always centered attention on the kinds
of legal duties assumed by contract. A great deal of the book is
therefore appropriately devoted to explaining the complex Roman law
of obligations that was based upon agreements, express or implied, by
private parties to pay money, perform services, or transfer property.
Since Roman law knew no general law of contract, this exposition of
the law of obligations requires explication of many different sorts of
transactions, beginning with the formal stipulatio and winding its way
forward to subjects on the very margins of contractual obligations, the
law of restitution, and the principle of unjust enrichment. Along this
long road lies excursions into the civil law of suretyship and the various
kinds of bailment, and then into the law relating to the sale of goods,
agency, partnership, and gifts. The author makes a slight detour for the
doctrine of causa, the rough civilian equivalent of our doctrine of
consideration. He deals with problems associated with void and
voidable agreements: error, fraud, compulsion, illegality, and
impossibility. He treats conditional contracts, on which the civil law
contained a vast body of complicated learning, some of which may
astound American lawyers. He finishes with a discussion of the
problems and legal remedies resulting from breach of contracts, and then
deals with their termination for reasons, such as release or supervening
impossibility, that could be proffered by one side or the other as
justification for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation.
The final six of the thirty-two chapters of the book deal with
obligations arising from delict. Here intentional and negligently caused
physical injuries to persons and property naturally take center stage,
although the law of defamation also assumes a strong supporting role.
The author deals at length with the Lex Aquilia and the fertile actio

7.
J. INST. 3.13.pr. Quasi-delictual liability clearly exists in substance under modem
American and English law, but we call it liability without fault or strict liability, instead of
using the Roman law term. See W.W. BUCKILAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW &
COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 395-98 (1952).
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iniuriarum. He illuminates topics that have long fascinated
anthropologically-minded lawyers: the institution of noxal surrender
and vicarious liability, for instance. But he goes much beyond,
examining the civilians' treatment of many problems that continue to
agitate modem lawyers. How far should we embrace a regime of strict
liability in preference to fault-based liability? Can the law of delict be
kept from spilling over its banks, so as to end by imposing liability for
acts that are more socially valuable than the harm they have caused?
What about making defendants pay when they have done no more than
commit an "act of omission"? Though the Roman lawyers dealt with a
society vastly different from our own in many ways - the law of
slaveiry for example, figured largely in their discussion of delict Zimmermann shows that their answers have continued to influence the
course of our law. Rightly so, he thinks. Even a dramatically changed
world has not rendered their approach to recurring legal issues, and
often their answers, necessarily obsolete.
When discussing each of these topics, Zimmermann's method is
consistent, subject to only minor modification under each topic. He
begins with the classical Roman law, setting out its most characteristic
and salient features. In this, he has his eyes firmly fixed both on the
limits and possibilities of juristic thought and on Roman society and
mores. The book discusses, but does not labor over, the exploration of
textual problems which have furnished the stuff of much important
Roman law scholarship. For example, Zimmermann has little time, and
apparently little patience, with the more extreme hypotheses of
interpolationist scholarship, though his text and footnotes show that he
is fully aware of it.' He likewise regards as artificial the traditional
practice of harmonizing apparently contradictory texts through
ingenuity, distinction, amplification, and limitation.9 He recognizes that
interpolation occurred, of course, though probably to a lesser extent than
is sometimes said. He recognizes that attempts to bring disparate texts
into harmony are possible, and perhaps inevitable. More often than not,
however, he cuts short the discussion of the possibilities of both, either
suggesting that a more extended inquiry would be only "a matter for
speculation,"" noting that it would only produce "an equation with
too many variables,"' or else concluding simply that the history of the

8.
See, e.g., ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1, at 282 (citing with approval the abandonment
of the "shifting sands of far-reaching interpolation allegations").
9.
See, e.g., id. at 160 ("an absolutely futile piece of Pandektenhannonisnus").
10.
Id. at 366 (dealing with the search for a unifying principle covering the potential
liability of lessors). See also id. at 1056 ("None of these hypotheses can be proved" of attempts
to bring the Digest of Justinian 47.10.15.15 into harmony with other texts dealing with attempts

on a woman's chastity.).
11.

See, e.g., id. at 966.
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Roman law has been "varied and eventful." 2 He does not have a
ready explanation for every inconsistency in the text.
Having sketched the main features of the Roman law, the author
continues in each section with a discussion of special problems that
inevitably arose in a legal system that changed from archaic to
sophisticated in the long span of time between the Twelve Tables and
the Justinianic compilations of the sixth century. Pressures on the
Roman law and consequent change within it stemmed from a wide
variety of factors: the internal logic of legal analysis; the exigencies of
commercial practice; the expansion of the territorial reach of the empire;
the influence of Greek thought; the ideals and failings of Roman society;
the arrival of Christianity; even the personal predilections of the
emperors." All these are grist for the author's mill.
From the achievements of the era of Justinian, the book moves
directly to the ius commune of the Middle Ages, that amalgamation of
Roman and canon law that long dominated European legal thought,
education, and, to a lesser extent, legal practice. 4 The additions and
changes to the dassical law attributable to the ius commune are noted.
For instance, classical Roman law had little useful to say about the law
of evidence. Development of workable law on the subject was the
product of this later era; it is now accessible in the encyclopedic treatise
tradition associated with names like Guilielmus Durantis (d. 1296),"
Josephus Mascardus (d. 1588),6 and Jacobus Menochius (d. 1607)."7
It is to the author's credit that his book recognizes this vital contribution
to Western law and develops it for English-speaking readers, for most
of whom it will be terra incognita.
The author regularly addresses contributions to the law made by the
usus modernus Pandectarum during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries," and also those of the natural school of law of the
seventeenth and eighteenth. 9 For instance, he shows that the natural
lawyers built on the base of developments within the ius commune in

12.
Id. at 40 (dealing with third party beneficiary contracts).
13.
Id. at 15 (noting the origin of the four-fold division of obligation in Justinian's "great
delight in the number four").
14.
See, e.g., MANuO BELLOMO, LEUROPA DEL DiRnrO COMUNE (5th ed. 1991), a book
which happily is soon to be translated into English.
15.
Author of SPECULUM IUDICIALE (Guillaume Durand ed., 1975) (Neudrnck Der Ausgabe
Basel 1574).
16.
Author of DE PROBATIONIBUS (1584-88), subsequently published in many editions but
not so far reprinted. See DAVID WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 814 (1980).
17.
Author of DE PRAESUMPTIONIBUS (1597), also published in several editions and not
reprinted. See generally 1 H. COING, EuROPAiscHES PR1vATRECHT 1500 Bis1800: ALTERES
GEMEINES RECHT 134-35 (1985) (regarding Menochiuss contributions to the use of presumptions
in the law of evidence).
18.
For an English introduction to the subject, see O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 327-29, 333 (1985).
19.
Id. at 354-66.
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rejecting the Roman law rule against enforcing contracts in favor of third
parties.
The position taken by Grotius, that the rule alteri stipulari
nemo potest was incompatible with principles of natural law, brought to
fruition juristic development that had begun earlier among Spanish
jurists. Along the way, Zimmermann skillfully weaves parallel
developments in the English common law into his story. Some parts of
the common law were profoundly touched by the ius commune and
many more are fruitfully compared with it. In adhering to the classical
principles against direct enforcement of third-party beneficiary contracts,
for example, one witnesses the nicely ironic situation in which the
English lawyers actually turned out to be more civilian than the civilians.
Having been carried almost effortlessly through time in a fashion
reminiscent of the feats of the great civilian commentators, the reader
may be surprised suddenly to find himself face-to-face with the modem
world. But he is put there. He is provided with selective, but always
intelligent and instructive, coverage of recent developments in the law
of obligations in Germany, France, South Africa, Great Britain, and the
United States. And each of the subjects is tied to its history within the
civilian tradition. For Zimmermann, legal history without modem
relevance "tends to become a rather sapless, purely 'academic' affair..
S.'21 He does not wish that fate for his book, and I can only say that
he avoids it. If it can be vindicated at all, the modem relevance of the
study of Roman law and its traditions is vindicated in these pages.
B. THE BOOK'S THEMES
Straightforward exposition of the civilian tradition is, appropriately,
the subject of most of the book. There is a lot that deserves exposition.
This does not mean, however, that the work lacks continuing themes or
that its author keeps clear of controversy. He has opinions.
Zimmermann is skeptical, for instance, about the desirability of the
doctrine of laesio enormis, and he says so.' To him, the economic
liberalism and private autonomy characteristic of classical Roman law
seem preferable, at least on the whole. The doctrine of laesio enormis
invited courts, in the interests of fairness, to make inroads in the ability
of contracting parties to set the price of goods being bought and sold.
The doctrine held that if the deal were unfair enough, it could be set
aside. This can be a mightily appealing approach, at least after the fact.
The doctrine has been adopted, and then set aside, more than once in the

20.
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1, at 43.
21.
Id. at viii.
22.
Id. at 270. It is not entirely dear that he is merely citing the opinions of South African
and German judges when he describes it as "[ijnherently arbitrary and preposterous, full of
pitfalls and anomalies, subversive and fatal ..
" Id. at 267.
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history of the civilian tradition. Today appears to be one of its "up"
moments. But Zimmermann is doubtful. He quotes the disparaging
analogy of the doctrine to a Hydra, apparently first drawn by Christian
Thomasius (d. 1 7 2 8 ),' and then suggests that before we embrace this

Hydra, or even try to tame it, we ought to take account of the lessons of
the doctrine's checkered past.24
On the other hand, Zimmermann is the opposite of a doctrinaire
even in habitually preferring the classical jurists' attitude toward freedom
of contract. The interplay between the attractions of a legal regime
enforcing unfettered choice and of one in which the law intervenes to
protect the weak and unfortunate recurs throughout this work, and
Zimmermann observes it with sophisticated detachment. In its attitude
towards what modem American lawyers describe as "penalty clauses"
in contracts, for example, European law has vacillated. Sometimes the
clauses have been enforced as written; sometimes not. Whenever the
law has moved decisively in one direction, a reaction in the other
direction seems always to have come along. This vacillation continues
to the present day, but the author's lh . word on the subject recognizes
how things now stand: in dealing with penalty clauses, unfettered
freedom of contract "is not acceptable under modern economic
circumstances."'
For American academic lawyers, and indeed for thoughtful Englishspeaking lawyers of every stripe, two recurring themes of the The Law
of Obligations are likely to be of the greatest interest. The first is the
author's examination of the ways in which the Roman law has decisively
influenced the course of later legal development, in centuries long after
and in places far removed from its origin. It raises the question of how
law changes. The second is the relation between the traditions of the
Continental ius commune and Anglo-American common law. It raises the
long-disputed questions of the insularity of English law, or perhaps
better said, the special character of the common law. Neither subject is
new. But Zimmermann has something new to say about both, and what
he says deserves our attention.
On a general level, no one can deny that the Roman law has been,
and to some extent continues to be, of importance in the formation of the
European legal tradition. The real question is to determine the exact
ways in which that influence has been felt, and to assess accurately the
extent to which the past has determined the present. How tight has the
grip of the great Pandectist tradition been on the actual course of the
law, and what real difference does it continue to make today?
23.
Id. at 263. On the views of Thomasius towards the civil law of contract, see Italo
Birocchi, La questione dei patti nella dottrina tedesca dell'Usus modernus, in TOWARDS A GENERAL
LAW OF CONTRACTS 139 (John Barton ed., 1990).
24.
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1, at 270.
25.
Id. at 107.
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Zimmermann treats the study of the Roman law and the ius commune,
even now, as fundamental for understanding any European legal system
regarding it as "a unifying force of great potential" in the European
Community. 6 He identifies four ways in which the civilian tradition
has created the modem law of obligations. The first is direct continuity.
It appears notably in codified form in Germany. The liability of sellers
of goods for latent defects furnishes a good example. The Bfirgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB), the German Civil Code adopted at the very end of
the last century, owed not only its organizing principles to enthusiastic
Romanists. On this particular question, the BGB "attempted little more
than to codify the current Roman common law" related to it.27
Tradition determined present law. Not that this was necessarily for the
best. The limited forms of relief available under Roman law have
discouraged German courts from adapting the law to meet the needs of
modem commerce. The civilian tradition can ossify as well as vivify.
But where there has been no evident or forceful reason to reject the
traditional law, it has remained intact.
Today, of course, the civilian tradition survives most actively in
South Africa, where the author taught for seven years at the University
of Cape Town before moving on to Regensburg. American lawyers
know mostly about South Africa's dilemmas as a racialist society, and
Zimmermann does not ignore that unhappy side of history.2 8
However, South Africa has also preserved something very like the
uncodified ius commune. It is there that we see jurists laboring to adapt
it to modem circumstances. It is also there that one sees the limits and
the possibilities of immersion in the civilian traditions, having, for
example, to decide what to do with contracts for surrogate motherhood
on the basis of a standard of boni mores taken from Roman-Dutch law.9
Zimmermann gives us an excellent tour.
The second source of continuity is rebirth. It has often happened
that one part or another of the civil law has fallen out of use or even
been rejected outright. Then, years later and perhaps wearing a slight
disguise, it springs back to life. The law of defamation in Germany
provides an example. The actio iniuriarum, as expanded under the ius
commune, governed practice in the early modem period. Its broad
definition of actionable language, its absorption of the Church's concern
to punish slanderers ratione peccati,' its desire to make whole the
reputation of persons wrongly slandered, and its adoption of a

26. Id. at xi.
27. Id. at 327.
28. Id. at xv.
29. Id. at 714.
30.
This expansive and much disputed principle would have allowed ecclesiastical courts
to take jurisdiction over temporal matters whenever the sin of one of the parties was involved.
See BRIAN TIERNY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH & STATE 1050-1300, at 127-31 (1964).
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presumption of animus iniuriandi,combined to give the civilian remedy
a largish scope.' Too great a scope, in fact. In time, the remedy began
to seem ridiculous, or at any rate inconsistent with the creed of a
gentleman? Bringing an action for defamation came to be regarded as
itself an abuse of the law. During the nineteenth century, it was
therefore eliminated little by little in Germany and, ultimately, the BGB
dropped it.' But wait! Perhaps it was not dead, only sleeping. In the
wake of the Nazi experience, the Germans embraced something called
the "general right of personality."'
In the author's view, the result has
been nothing less than the recreation of the old actio iniuriarum. As
Zimmermann puts it, "thrown out by the front door, the actio iniuriarum
has managed to sneak in through the back window ..... " It seems
hard to keep the civilian tradition down.'
The third means by which the civilian tradition has lived is through
its tenacious grip on the attitudes of lawyers, judges, and law professors.
For most of its history, the ius commune has furnished the basis for
European legal education. This fact is bound to have made a difference,
even where statutes, constitutions, or wholly different circumstances
have intervened. Lawyers, at least most lawyers, resist drastic change.
They come at new problems with attitudes formed by what they know
of the past. This inclines them naturally towards a "minimalist" reading
of the changes they are obliged to implement. Thus, for example, in
interpreting statutes dealing with the allocation of the risk of loss to
chattels being worked upon by bailees, German lawyers regarded the
texts of the BGB with minds saturated in the Roman law Digest. They
minimized any change, retaining the civilian approach towards the
problem of allocation of risk of accidental loss between bailor and bailee
in the face of statutes purporting to codify and define the whole law on
the subject. The confrontation thus led to "a nice example" of the
holding power of the ius commune, "even against the odds of codificatory
intervention."37
The fourth means by which the civilian tradition has made its
presence felt is as a "Treasure House" of good ideas.' Lawyers have
quarried the Digest for solutions to new problems, and they have found

31.
32.

See ZRAMERMANN, supranote 1, at 1067-70.
Interestingly, the current American preoccupation, protecting freedom of speech,

seems to have played no role in the demise of the remedy. At least, Zimmermann mentions
none.
33.
Id. at 1091-92.
34.
Id. at 1092.
35.
Id. (emphasis added).
36.
See id. at 1054-55. The tort of "attempting a woman's chastity" is a similar English
example from an earlier period. MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN
ENGLAND, 1570-1640, at 240 (1987).
37.
ZAIMERMANN, supra note 1, at 404.
38.
Id. (quoting HERMANN KANTOROWICZ, BRACrONIAN PROBLEMS 126 (1941)).
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in it things that never existed in classical Roman law. The theory that
the fundamental basis for contractual liability rests upon the concurrence
of the consent of two persons, made familiar to American lawyers by
their law school training in "offer and acceptance" and the necessity of
a "meeting of the minds" in the formation of contracts, is one such
product. The Roman law of obligations had not depended on this
theory; it knew a much more formal system of contractual obligation.
But in the eighteenth century, when Domat and Pothier wished to find
support for their consensus theory of contracts, they turned to the
Digest 9 True enough, what they required involved a highly selective
use of the texts found in the Digest. But the variety of ideas found
therein is in fact very great. It was the Roman law of consensus that
furnished the building blocks they needed to create a general theory of
contractual obligation. Thus, the civilian tradition proved fruitful in
ways that might have surprised its founders.'
These four sources of the civilian tradition's continued vitality are
exposed with clarity in the text, and they are connected forcefully and
convincingly with the author's argument that his subject has direct
contemporary relevance. The reviewer's doubts have to do only with
how far the argument should be pushed. The spectacle of historical
reliance on inherited civilian tradition may lead to a despair about
lawyers' ability to escape the shackles of inherited categories, 4' or it
may lead instead to an exaggerated romanticism about the
transformative powers of the ius commune. Zimmermann inclines only
occasionally to the second, and not terribly far in its direction. But even
so, I wonder: is it really right to say, as one author does, that in modem
law "[i]t is only by examining the continuity and transformation of
Roman law within the history of the ius commune.., that we can make
meaningful profess," as the author does?4' The reviewer will readily
confess that he shares the author's hope that this is so, but he has had
some difficulty persuading himself that this is actually the case. There
are too many situations where the civilian tradition has been fruitfully
rejected, and in which the best that can be said is that it provides "the
background against which to evaluate such a decision...."43
Another theme of interest about which the book has much to say,
and will be of interest to readers of the Journal, is the relationship

39.
Id. at 567.
40.
Zimmermann also explains that the rule that contracts are to be read against the
drafter, is "a good example of how isolated utterances of the Roman jurists were able to become
the forts
and origo of a general rule of law .. " Id. at 639.
41.
See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, FAILURES OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1988). Zimmermann
also recognizes of course that the civilian tradition can be an obstacle to progress. For example,
he writes that following Roman law about latent defects in the sale of goods "does not have
only beneficial effects." ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1, at 327.
42.

ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1,at 270.

43.

Id. at 230.
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between Continental law and the English common law. There is a good
deal of current scholarly interest and research about this question, on
both sides of the English Channel and on both sides of the Atlantic
Ocean. 46 Zimmermann clearly thinks that there should be more. In his
view, the English and European traditions have never been "so radically
distinct as is often suggested," and indeed this connection has often been
more than accidental parallelism.' The Roman legal tradition, in his
opinion, "never ceased, through various channels, to exercise a
considerable influence on English law .... "'
The form of connection about which the book says the most, but
which, concededly, is more interesting than probative, is a similarity in
the attitudes and methods of the traditional English lawyer and the
classical Roman jurist. It should be understood that this type of
similarity is not so much a result of the direct influence of Roman law,
as it is a result of a more general similarity in the social structures
present in both Roman and English society. Both were suspicious of
system. Both thought about concrete cases, comparing them,
distinguishing them, and building upon them. That seemed the right
occupation for a lawyer, and they were very good at doing it. This is to
say, both classical Roman and English lawyers were practical men. They
had no taste for a law "characterized by impractical abstractions."4 7
They created no "neat and rational system,"' and they saw no need for
one. On the contrary, their work had a "wholly casuistic character."4 9
To the extent that there was a divergence between England and the
Continent on this point, it was the product of a later period, when
"systematizers" invaded and changed the original civilian tradition.
This recurring theme will surprise many English speaking readers.
It is the opposite of a commonly held view that regards Roman law as
inherently more "systematic" than the common law, and perhaps the
author occasionally pushes the parallel just a little harder than the

See, e.g., HELMUr COiNG & KNUT WOLFGANG NORR, ENGLISCHE UND KONTINENTALE
44.
RECHTSGESCHICHTE: EIN FORSCHUNGSPROJEKT (1985) (including subsequent volumes published
under their auspices under the series title ComparativeStudies in Continentaland Anglo-American
Legal History). See also Gino Gorla & Luigi Moccia, A 'Revisiting' of the Comparison Between
'ContinentalLaw' and 'English Law' (16th to 19th Century), 2 J. LEGAL HIST. 143 (1981) (comparing
the development of English law and Continental law from the sixteenth century to the
beginning of the nineteenth century). I have tried to sum up my own (largely congruent) views
on the subject in R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and Common Law: Historical Strangers or
Companions?, 1990 DuKE .J. 1207.
45.
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1, at xi.

46.

Id.

Id.
47.
48.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 913. See also id. at 340 ("quite uninterested in abstract categorization"); id. at 587
49.
("[T]he last thing we can expect to find is, of course, a neat and logical theoretical framework
.... "); id. at 684 ("The Roman lawyers, as may be expected, did not bother with subtle
dogmatic distinctions.").
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evidence warrants. Reading along, one expects to come across Baron
Parke in a toga, Ulpian in the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, it
is well that the point is made. The urge to create systems and the belief
in the power of abstract definitions do not stand out either in the texts
of the Digest or the attitudes of the early jurists. These things were
regarded with suspicion even during the Middle Ages. It was only
during the later development of the ius commune, most particularly in the
heyday of the natural law school, that ideal and logical systems truly
came into their own.
This parallel is part of what has been well described as an "inner
relationship" between Roman law and English common law.'
It
means that the two are similar, even though there has been no actual
Roman law influence on the development of English law. Similar social
settings and similar juridical institutions give rise to similarity in legal
outcome. Other examples are the formulary system itself,5' the
common use of legal maxims," and parts of the law of crimes and
torts. 3 In them, it is accidental, but not wholly surprising, that the
English law should sometimes turn out to be more like the classical
Roman law than some of the legal systems derived more directly from
it. There is affinity without direct connection.
In a second common situation dealt with in The Law of Obligations,
however, there is a more direct connection. It involves the knowing use
by English lawyers of categories, ideas, and phrases drawn from the
Roman legal tradition and used consciously to shape the English
common law itself. It is about this kind of supposed civilian influence
that most debate has swirled, because it may be thought to detract from
the uniqueness and even the excellence of the common law if it turns out
that it has substantial roots in the civilian tradition. Many historians of
English law reject it altogether,;' contending that the systems were
different in fundamental ways, and that only the most superficial sort of
civilian influence actually occurred. They point out that in the extreme
form of the argument, the special character of English law disappears
altogether. The common law then becomes simply one more part of a
general western legal tradition.' The difference between English and
French law becomes no more significant than, say, the difference
between the legal systems of France and Spain.

50.
Fritz Pringsheim, The Inner RelationshipBetween Englishand Roman Law, 5 CAMBRIDGE
LJ.347 (1935).
51.
BUcCLAND & MCNAIR, supra note 7, at 409.
52.
PEER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS 154-56 (1966).
53.
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 1, at 913.
54.
See, e.g., R.C. van Caenegem, The English Common Law, a Divergencefrom the European
Pattern,47 TJDscmiFr VOOR REcHTsGEScHIEDEI.S 1, 3 (1979) (speaking of "this extraordinary
divergence, this real aberration from the established European pattern").
55.
This is essentially the view expressed by Harold Berman. See HAROLD BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION (1983).
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Zimmermann's work brings him within the camp of those who argue
that there has been real influence on English common law. However, he
does not strain the evidence. The English Channel remains in place. He
thinks that in some areas of the law, substantial influence has occurred.
In others, and seemingly the majority, the borrowing has been mostly
superficial. There has been no wall of separation between England and
the Continent, but neither has there been identity.
A representative example of the true influence of Roman law is the
law of bailments. Through Sir John Holt's opinion in the celebrated case
of Coggs v. Bernard (1703),6 and by means of the influential
commentaries on the subject by Sir William Jones..' and Justice Story,
"the Roman law of commodatum, depositum, and pignus entered into
English law."59 Zimmermann explores this in convincing detail. Here,
the initial and avowed use of civilian terminology and principles,
coupled with the subsequent identity at many points between the
common law and Continental law of bailments, make the reality of
influence hard to deny. True, denial can be attempted. It can be
asserted that the common law cases have only a "coating of Roman
terms" and that the "internal growth" of the law on the subject has been
"purely English." 60 But even if one could understand exactly what this
counterargument means, it is too apologetic to carry conviction. And
indeed, the kind of influence suggested by the law of bailments exists in
too manrX aspects of the law - in suretyship, 61 gifts,62 breach of
contract, even strict liability in tort" - for much doubt to remain.
Repetition of the pattern demonstrates the reality of legal borrowing.
However, the book also shows that sometimes the civilian influence
exercised on the common law has truly been superficial. Influence is not
an "all or nothing" proposition. Common lawyers have, for instance,
long been attached to the use of maxims and catch-phrases in legal
argument. Many of these were undoubtedly drawn originally from the
civilian tradition: consensus ad idem, for example, in the formation of
contracts. This phrase, borrowed from Pothier and a vital part of his
56.
Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld Raym 909 (1703).
57.
Author of AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (2d ed. 1804). Zimmermann calls this
"the first English monograph,... which can properly be called a legal treatise." ZIMMERMANN,
supra note 1, at 189. Before accepting this very debatable conclusion, the reviewer would like
to have been furnished with a fuller statement of what it takes to qualify as a genuine treatise.
Author of COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (2d ed. 1840).
58.
59.
ZNMMERMANN, supra note 1, at 203-05.
60.
2 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 318-19 (1906).
61.
See ZIMMERMANN, supranote 1, at 144 ("The rules relating to fideiussio have shaped
the accessory nature of the surety's liability.").
62.
Id. at 506 (describing the doctrine of consideration as delivered by "a midwife
wrapped in Roman-Canon dressing").
63.
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64.
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"will theory" of contracts, has worked its way into English and
American contract law. But the frequency of its use has never meant
that we have imported Pothier's theories whole. In fact, in many ways
the reverse is true: in important particulars they have been rejected.'
The same holds true for the use of civilian maxims by common lawyers.
They may come from the storehouses of the ius commune, but their
common usage no more means that the common lawyers' views were
thereby determined by the civil law than the fact that I have a Japanese
bowl in my living room means that Japanese culture has had a
measurable influence upon my life. I simply like its looks. Conceivably,
I may not even know that the bowl comes from Japan. Its existence
should keep me from asserting that there has been no United StatesJapanese trade, but real influence is another matter. Influence can follow
trade when the conditions are right. But it need not.
C. THE BOOK'S MERITS
None of the foregoing should leave the impression that this book is
strictly organized so as to express and prove a packaged set of themes.
It is organized around the civil law of obligations. Within this capacious
structure, the book has a learned but free ranging character - a little
difficult to catch in a review, but a delight to read nonetheless. This
character is evident, above all, in the range and variety of subjects the
author takes up and relates to his subject. The book moves easily
backward and forward in time, and its scope is wide. The law's
attitudes toward animals, toward the effects of the "follies" to which
lovers are ,prone,67 and toward the persistence of duelling among
gentleman, all claim the author's attention. He relates them to the
substance of the law of obligations. That rich Romans had a taste for
tables made of expensive wood,6 9 that Roman schoolboys learned the
Twelve Tables by heart7 ° or that the god Hermes was thought to
protect both merchants and thieves," are all taken up and shown to
have had an effect on the course of the civilian tradition. Zimmermann
has a sharp eye for the telling example. They seem almost to jump out
at the reader from quite unexpected comers of human experience.
The book is lively in more than its examples. Although it contains
the occasional indication that the author's native language is not English,
these instances are remarkably few. He has read and mastered much of
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Id. at 601.
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the literature of English comparative law and legal history,' and he
clearly used his years in South Africa to good advantage. He writes
with what appears to this reviewer to be the product of a special delight
in using a language that is not his own. The prose is sprightly and
imaginative, always comprehensible, and it is spiced throughout with the
author's patiently skeptical sense of humor.
Finally, and this may be the book's greatest merit for most readers
of the Journal,Zimmermann is a master of the clear summary of difficult
topics. If a reader is in search of a basic understanding of the realities
of the Roman law stipulatio, the origins and difficulties of the doctrine
of laesio enormis,74 or the role of commercial practice and the canon law

in shaping a general law of contracts,75 it will be hard for him to find
a better resource than this volume. All these are but examples.
Throughout, complicated subjects are reduced to manageable size, and
they are illuminated by the author's balanced judgments. Zimmermann
claims in his introduction that, despite its considerable size, his book is
actually "alarmingly short."76 One sees what he means. It could be
much longer, given its scope in time and subject. On this point, it is
nevertheless impossible to agree with him. The book's "alarming
shortness" is one of its many merits.
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